In a common currency area, the common central bank sets a uniform rate of inflation across countries, taking into account the area's economic conditions. Suppose countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion: when national business cycles are not fully synchronized, a conflict of interest between members arises. If member governments have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. This creates an inefficiency over and above the onepolicy-fits-all cost discussed in the optimal currency area literature. In order to minimize this extra-burden of asymmetric information, monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric shocks of different sizes.
cycles are not fully synchronized, a conflict of interest between members arises. When governments of member countries have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. Ignoring the problem can be extremely costly, since the CCB may end up inappropriately implementing "stop and go" policies that add to inflation variability. This informational problem magnifies the one-policy-fits-all inefficiency discussed in the optimal currency area literature. The paper's main result is that in a currency area with asymmetric information, the optimal monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric ones of unequal sizes. Overall, asymmetric information aggravates the problem of tailoring the policy response to the state of the union's economy, and causes a welfare loss that is increasing in the number of member countries. We also show that disregarding some of the information reported by the national authorities and adopting a "rule of thumb" is never efficient, although this rule closely mimics the optimal rule when large shocks are either very rare or very frequent. The paper's central idea is that there is an important information asymmetry between policymakers in different countries as to what they know about domestic macroeconomic conditions. This can give rise to outright misrepresentation of statistics (for example, a country might misreport its unemployment rate, see below), misinterpretation of statistics (for example, national policymakers might be better placed than their foreign counterparts to judge the implications of labor market outcomes on the deviation of output from trend), deliberate lack of transparency about the information sources, gathering process, and timeliness of release of statistics (these issues are covered by the IMF surveillance procedure under the heading of Report on Observance of Standard and Codes (ROSC) 2 ). In his presidential address to the International Statistical Institute, Felligi (1989) raises the issue quite clearly.
"…Statistical information is a product with peculiar attributes. One of them is that users are seldom in a position to check its quality directly. Yet data that are not trusted are clearly of little utility, whatever their intrinsic quality."
The case of the rate of unemployment in the UK is quite suggestive. In the 1980s, British labor economists have been bewildered by the ever-changing definition of unemployment. Gregg (1994) recalls that "…Charges … against the count method of estimating unemployment have concerned allegations about politically inspired manipulation of the figures through numerous changes in coverage during the 1980s. The supporting evidence for these changes is that all but one of these changes have been unidirectional-downwards." 2. Quoting the IMF website, "ROSCs summarize the extent to which countries observe certain internationally recognized standards and codes. The IMF has recognized 11 areas and associated standards as useful for the operational work of the Fund and the World Bank. These comprise data, monetary and financial policy transparency, fiscal transparency, banking supervision, securities, insurance, payments systems, corporate governance, accounting, auditing, and insolvency and creditor rights."
Critics have expressed a view that calculating unemployment on the old (pre-1982) coverage would result in a considerably higher total figure. 3 Lack of confidence in the figures became so serious that a government Working Party was set up to analyze the question: according to the ensuing official report,
The level of unemployment in a country is a key indicator of economic and social well-being. The UK figures published monthly are eagerly awaited and hotly debated. Recently, and especially during the early part of 1994, debate became intense and it was claimed, on behalf of the Opposition, that the figures were worthless. It was implied that they were manipulated by the government for its own political ends. This matter is of great concern for Society… (Bartholomew et al. 1995) 4 . We think that these informational problems are potentially more serious at the international level, for arrangements such as currency unions and federal redistribution schemes. In this spirit, Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (2001) argue that "…in the European Union or in countries such as Russia and China (Laffont 1995)…, national or regional governments are the primary source of statistical information … while federal authorities are at a disadvantage in assessing the quality of this information."
With the exception of Bottazzi and Manasse (1998) , the issue of asymmetric information in common currency areas has received no attention in the literature. 5 Dixit (2000, p. 779) , however, mentions this among the "important extension(s) for future research" in the field of monetary policy in currency unions. Conversely, a large quantity of public economics literature exists, particularly on fiscal federalism that deals with problems of information. Recent examples include: Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001) , who study inter-regional redistribution when tax bases are imperfectly observable by the federal government; Cremer, Marchand, and Pestieu (1994) , Bucovetsky, Maurice, and Pestieu (1996) , and Levaggi (1991) deal with intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information over local preferences; Boadway, Isao, and Jha (1995) , Raff and Wilson (1995), and Lockwood (1996) study the issue of public goods provision when technology is imperfectly observable; and finally, Laffont (1995) studies fiscal arrangements in China.
3. According to Bartholomew et al. (1995) "...in the 1970s, the figure for unemployment broadly related to those receiving unemployment benefits, plus those who did not receive benefits but registered themselves regularly for possible work. Increasingly, during the early 1980s, the latter group was excluded from the count and the former group was tightened up. For example, in 1981, some 195,000 individuals were struck off the count by the removal of those in training or in temporary work; in 1982, a further 216,000 individuals were struck off when benefit claimants only were included in the figures; in 1983, some 107,000 men who were over 60 years of age, not working and not entitled to benefits or credits, were similarly struck off the count. An important consequence of these and other changes was the unease expressed by the general public about what the published figures actually meant and how the changes, which occurred both up or down, could be effectively assessed."
4. Another example is the elimination of the interest rate on mortgages from the definition of the CPI in 1993 in Britain. This was done in order to prevent inflation form shooting up whenever interest rates were raised. Avinash Dixit jokingly told us about the "Dixit and Goodhart" definition of "core" inflation: the index covering all goods whose prices have not increased (!). Other interesting stories on statistics can be read on the BBC site: http://www.stats.org/statswork/bbc-stats.htm.
5. With respect to our previous work, here we do not insist on microfoundations, and change the equilibrium concept from dominant to Bayesian strategies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 considers the benchmark case of full information. In Section 3, we extend the setup to asymmetric information. First, we show that the full information policy is not incentive-compatible, and we discuss the potential costs of ignoring the problem of information. We then discuss the optimal policy rule. Section 4 briefly discusses some possible extensions of the model, and Section 5 summarizes the main results.
THE MODEL
There are two endowment-economies, each populated by an identical representative agent. The agent's indirect utility function, W, depends on inflation π, and on an output shock, e, representing the deviation of output from trend. A negative realization means that the economy is in "recession," a positive one that the economy is in "expansion." The output shocks are independent across countries. We require the indirect utility function W(π, e) to have some intuitive properties
where W x (.) denotes the partial derivative of W with respect to x. The first property captures the positive effects of output on consumption. The second and the third represent the idea that at a low level inflation, π is beneficial; above a certain threshold, however, the benefits peter out and the costs of inflation increase. Note that due to the last inequality, a country's most preferred rate of inflation falls when the state of the economy improves. In Appendix, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of the money-into-the utility-function type, where welfare in steady state exhibits such properties. For this model, adapted from Bottazzi and Manasse (2002) , seigniorage is an efficient way of financing the provision of a public good, when inflation is low. When inflation is high, however, distortions in money demand and declining marginal utility of the public good set in, and reduce welfare. Moreover, in that model, the preferred rate of inflation declines with output for the following reason: high output yields high fiscal revenue and reduces the need of seigniorage revenue. For expositional purposes, we assume that the indirect utility function takes the quadratic form
and assume that e can take a finite number of realizations in the interval [Ϫs, s] , s Ͼ 0 with probabilities p(e), ͚ e p(e) ϭ 1, expected value E(e) ϭ 0, and variance σ 2 e . The disturbances across countries, e and e′ ("the other's" state), are independent. It will be very convenient to consider the particular case where e can take only four possible realizations, {Ϫs, Ϫsր2, sր2, s}, with equal probability p(e) ϭ 1/4. Under the assumption 6 of discrete uniform distribution, the shocks have zero mean, and variance σ 2 e ϭ (5ր8)s 2 .
6. We carry on with the more general notation p(e), since we discuss a more general case later on.
FULL INFORMATION

Monetary Independence
Next we characterize the full information optimal policy when each country has monetary sovereignty. We show that the optimal rule is counter-cyclical. After the realization of the shock, the national central bank chooses inflation so as to
The optimal inflation rule is simply given by π(e) ϭ Ϫe .
The first-best rule is to run an expansionary policy in bad times and a contractionary policy in good times. We can calculate the expected utility in this benchmark case, as well as the first two moments of inflation
In the benchmark of monetary independence (MI), the average inflation rate is zero, and its variability exactly matches that of the "fundamentals'."
CCA Under Full Information
Next, we describe the optimal policy in a CCA when the two states e, e′ are fully observable. We show that the standard inefficiency of the optimal currency area literature arises because of the impossibility to tailor the common policy to individual needs. In a common currency area, monetary policy is set by the common central bank, the CCB, which chooses a common inflation rate, after observing the realizations of the shocks in the two countries. Thus, the CCB solves
The optimal policy rule is
What matters now is the aggregate (mean) state of the economy. This rule has some intuitive properties: (1) it treats both types equally (it is "fair"), 7 . We normalize the f(e) function so that ͚e p(e)f(e) ϭ 0.
(2) it is symmetric, π(e, e′) ϭ Ϫπ(Ϫe, Ϫe′); (3) it is nonincreasing in the shocks, π E e (e, e′) ≤ 0 , so that inflation is not raised when more favorable shocks are reported, and (4) it coincides with the first-best rule when shocks are identical, π E (e, e) ϭ π(e). The last two properties show the nature of the conflict of interest between countries, when shocks differ: the country experiencing a recession ("boom") favors a looser (tighter) monetary policy than the one implemented by the CCB: π(e′) Ͼ π E (e, e′) Ͼ π(e) for e Ͼ e′. Thus, the rule gives rise to the standard inefficiency of currency unions, the one-policy-fits-all, whenever shocks are asymmetric. We can compare the two regimes by computing welfare
Compared to the regime of monetary independence, the CCA reduces welfare considerably. 8 The loss does not stem from the average level of inflation, which is the same in the two regimes, but from the inability to tailor the policy response to the shocks. Since these are assumed to be independent, the policy rule cannot match the variability of the state of each individual economy. This is the standard loss of an independent policy tool for stabilization.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Suppose now that both governments have some private information regarding the state of their own economy: the domestic government observes e but not e′, and the foreign one vice versa. The CCB cannot verify either one. In such circumstances, the policy rule of the CCB must be contingent on the states reported by the two governments, ẽ, ẽ ′. Each government may try to exploit its informational advantage in order to induce the CCB to choose a policy that better fits the state of its own economy. If the CCB ignores this incentive, she ends up choosing the "right" policy for the "wrong" state. Therefore, she must design a policy rule such that truthful revelation occurs. Next, we show that in order to "separate" the types and extract the correct information, the rule must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to small asymmetric ones.
The Game
Let's be more precise about the game being played. The timing is as follows. In stage 1, the CCB designs a policy rule π(ẽ, ẽ ′) that depends on the reports. In stage 2, 8 . The numbers in the example must be treated with caution, since they rely on the normalization
the shocks are realized, but only national governments observe national realizations. In stage 3, given the policy rule, countries simultaneously choose a report in order to maximize their own expected utility, where the expectation is taken over the other country's report. Finally, the CCB implements the rule according to the reported states.
The optimal reporting strategy of "type" e, R(e, π(ẽ, ẽ ′)) consists in choosing the state to report, ẽ, so as to maximize its own expected utility, taking the expectations over the other country's report
where E ẽ ′ denotes type e expectation over the other country's report, ẽ ′. An equilibrium with truthful revelation is defined as a set of reports ẽ, ẽ ′ and policy rule π(ẽ, ẽ ′), such that (1) given the policy rule, each country chooses an optimal report, R(.); (2) reports are truthful, R(e,π(ẽ, ẽ ′)) ϭ e; and (3) the policy rule is optimal, in the sense that it maximizes expected welfare
The policy can be viewed as a contract that the two parties (the governments) sign before the realization of the shocks. The contract describes the rate of inflation that the CCB must implement in all possible contingencies.
Incentives to Lie
Here, we show that the second-best rule π E (.) (Equation 7) does not induce truthtelling, i.e., it is not incentive-compatible. Intuitively, given this rule, each country is tempted to overemphasize its shock, so as to pull the rate of inflation closer to its most preferred rate π(e). But then, if the governments systematically lie to the CCB, and CCB insists on applying π E , the consequence is a sharp drop in welfare. The CCB can do better, but at the cost of introducing some distortions in her policy rule.
To see this, first we need to calculate the optimal report when the rule π E (.) is implemented. Having observed the realization of his own state, type e chooses his report by forming an expectation on ẽ ′. We can write a country expected welfare 9 as
where E ẽ ′ is the country's expectation over the other's report, ẽ ′, Var ẽ ′ [π] is the variance with respect to the same expectation, and e is known. Equation (7) implies that Var ẽ ′ [π] is independent of the country's own report, ẽ, while the symmetric structure of the setup implies that E ẽ ′ (ẽ ′) ϭ 0. Thus, the country can choose ẽ to maximize Ϫ(1ր2)(Ϫẽր2) 2 Ϫe(Ϫẽր2), which yields ẽ ϭ 2e.
9. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this leaner way to prove the result.
In words, when the policy π E is followed, both reports will "exaggerate" the shock, whenever possible. Those who indeed experience the extreme states, ±s, are constrained to report the truth, since e ϭ ±2s simply does not exist. Moreover, types ±s have no scope for under-reporting: if they declare an intermediate state, they end up pushing the CCB in the "wrong" direction."
10 Conversely, the intermediate types will always lie under the full information rule. The mild-recession type, Ϫs/2, for example, expects the other to report zero on average, so he knows that if he declares the truth and the CCB follows the rule π E (ẽ,ẽ ′) , he will get on average π E ϭ s/4. But this policy is "too tight" for him: his first best is π(-s/2) ϭ s/2 Ͼ s/4. In order to induce the CCB to implement a looser policy, he declares that the economy is experiencing a large recession (and reports -s instead). By doing so (if the CCB believes him), he expects to get away with his first best, π E (Ϫs, 0) ϭ π(Ϫsր2) ϭ sր2. The same argument holds for type s/2, who will always exaggerate the positive state and report a "boom," s, in order to get a tighter policy. 
The Dangers of "Closing the Eyes"
The implication of this is striking: should the CCB "close her eyes" and adhere to the full information rule when governments cheat, she would end up alternating between extremely loose, π E (-s, -s) ϭ s, and extremely tight, π E (s, s) ϭ Ϫs, policies. With governments cheating, expected welfare
In this example, cheating implies a 20% welfare loss with respect to the full information benchmark (1 Ϫ U C րU E ϭ 0.2). Clearly, this loss stems from the effective adoption of a stop and go policy that leads to large swings in inflation. The variance of inflation becomes 60% (ϭ 16/10Ϫ1) larger than that under full information.
The Optimal Policy Under Asymmetric Information
The CCB can do better by designing a policy rule that is incentive-compatible. We apply the revelation principle to our game, so that if an equilibrium of the game exists, it must also be a solution to the following problem: the CCB chooses a policy rule that maximizes expected welfare subject to the incentive compatibility constraints. 12 10. For example, type -s likes a very expansionary policy π(-s) ϭ s, and, if he tells the truth, he expects to get a rate of inflation π E ϭ s/2, which is lower than desired. However, if he lies and reports, for example, -s/2, he only harms himself, as he manages to induce an even less expansionary policy, π E ϭ s/4.
11. This argument exploits the fact that Eπ E (.) ϭ π E (E(.)) due to the linearity of π E (.).
12. We do not consider the participation constraint on the basis that there is no possibility of opting out of the CCA. We also assume that the rule cannot be renegotiated.
We assume that the rule must satisfy property (3) of Section 2, namely being "nonincreasing in the shocks." This guarantees that "extreme" type ±s will never be willing to lie, so that we need only to consider the incentive compatibility constraint of types s/2 (and -s/2). Also, properties (1) and (2) of fairness and symmetry turn out to be satisfied by the optimal rule. Formally, this solves Problem 1 max π(e, e′) U(π(e, e′) , e) ϩ U(π(e, e′), e′) ,
The incentive compatibility constraint (Equation 13) states that, under the rule, type s/2 is at least as well-off, in expected terms, by reporting s/2 rather than s. A similar interpretation applies to Equation (14) for type -s/2. The solution of this problem is simplified by noting that, because of symmetry of the optimal rule, π(e, e′) ϭ Ϫπ(Ϫe, Ϫe′), either both constraints bind, or neither does. Similarly, the fairness property, π(e, e′) ϭ π(e′, e), implies that we need not write down the two constraints for country e′. 13 In the Appendix, we prove the following proposition. 
; (iii) the rule coincides with π E (.) in the remaining cases of symmetric shocks (s/2, s), (-s/2, -s), (s/2, s/2), (-s/2, -s/2), and of small asymmetric shocks (s/2, -s/2).
Note that the policy π S is fair (π S (e, e′) ϭ π S (e′, e)) and symmetric (π S (e, e′) ϭ -π S (-e′, -e)). The proposition has an intuitive interpretation. The rule must make the intermediate types indifferent, in expected terms, between reporting the truth and lying. It does so in two ways (see Figure 1) . First, in order to discourage extreme (false) reports, it makes inflation so high in symmetric bad states (-s, -s), and so low in good ones (s, s) that only countries, which really experience these shocks may want to say so. This explains point (i). At the same time, the policy encourages truth-telling by giving rents to the intermediate types in asymmetric states of different size, e.g., (s/2, -s). Here, the rule distorts the rate of inflation towards the center, i.e., towards the level preferred by the intermediate types. Note that the alternative of punishing the one who reports -s by further raising inflation would not work here, since then type s/2 would have an even greater incentive to lie (and report s). This explains point (ii). Finally, the policy does not need to distort the outcomes (s/2, s/2), (s/2, -s/2), (s/2, s), and (-s/2, -s/2), (-s/2, s/2), (-s/2, -s) (cf. point (iii)). Intuitively, the rule aims at making type s/2 indifferent, in expected terms, between telling the truth and exaggerating. But there is no need to deviate from the optimal rule, since type s/2 is already indifferent between the outcome (s/2, s/2) and a lottery with equally likely outcomes (s/2, s/2), (s/2, -s/2), (s/2, s).
How 
In this example, welfare under asymmetric information falls below full information, but just by 0.8% (ϭ 1 -U S /U E ), compared to the 20% loss of the cheating outcome. On one hand, by penalizing "large" reports, the policy makes sure that these are reported less frequently, i.e., only when they truly occur. On the other, the large induced inflation swings that occur in extreme states are compensated by smaller swings when asymmetric shocks of different sizes are reported.
Is "Pooling" (Rule of Thumb) Ever Optimal?
In order to eliminate the incentive to lie of the intermediate type, the optimal rule may, in principle, be contingent only on a sub-set of the reported information, e.g., the "sign" (expansion/recession) of the shocks, but not on their size (large/ small). This possibility is interesting since the optimal policy rule could then be interpreted as a "rule of thumb," a rule that picks the same rate of inflation irrespective of whether shocks s or s/2 are reported. Next, we show that "pooling" cannot be optimal. By definition, the rule of thumb must maximize expected utility (Equation 12 ) and satisfy the constraints
It is immediate to show (see the Appendix) that the first-order conditions for the optimal rule in states (s/2, s), (s, s), (s/2, s/2) cannot be satisfied by the same inflation rate. Thus, "pooling" cannot be optimal. 15 14. We assume that indifference is enough to induce truth-telling in the calculation below. 15. By computing the expected utility under the pooling π P rule, one finds that
The pooling rule is clearly preferable to the cheating outcome (compare Equations 16 and 11), but it is worse than the optimal rule (compare Equations 16 and 15).
EXTENSIONS
Next, we discuss some possible extensions of the model. First, we consider the case where small and large shocks occur with different probabilities. Second, we briefly discuss the case of many countries.
Distribution of Shocks
Suppose that "large" and "small" shocks occur with different probabilities. How does this affect the results? Two important things happen. First, when the probability associated with either small or large shocks tends to be zero, the full information solution applies: the CCB can safely ignore the reports concerning states that occur with zero probability. Second, when large shocks becomes sufficiently likely, the relative inefficiency of the rule of thumb (pooling) becomes negligible.
Assume that the probabilities satisfy
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, so that large shocks are relatively rare when p Ͻ 1/2. Back to Full Information. Consider the "extreme" cases when p → 0 or p → 1: here, the problem of asymmetry of information disappears. It is easy to show that when large shocks almost "never" occur, p → 0 , the CCB can safely disregard "large reports" and optimally choose π
16 Similarly, if p → 1 , so that small shocks "never" occur, the CCB can safely disregard "small reports" and optimally choose π S (s, s/2) ϭ π E (s, s). The Inefficiency of the Rule of Thumb. It is easy to show that the "pooling" rule for the general case of distribution (Equation 17 ) is given by
Clearly, the higher the probability of large shocks, the higher the (in absolute value) inflation under pooling. When p ϭ 1/2, the solution is π P ϩ ϭ Ϫ(3ր4)s, as before. It is very difficult to find a closed form solution for the optimal policy π S for the case p ʦ (0, 1). However, we can resort to a numerical solution (see Table  1 below) and calculate the levels of welfare associated with the optimal rule and the rule of thumb, for different values of the probability of large shocks, p.
17
16. In the (zero probability) event of two large reports, for example (s, s), any inflation rate (and among them π E (s)) will do. 17. In the Appendix, we show that part (i) of Proposition 1 goes through in nonuniform case p(e), i.e., the rule must over-react to large asymmetric shock. Similarly, the result that symmetric reports (ẽ, Ϫẽ) are not distorted still applies. Finally, a sufficient condition for the rule to under-react to asymmetric shocks of different magnitude (cf. part (ii) of Proposition 1), is that the probability of large shocks p ≥ 1/2. For the remaining cases (cf. part (iii) of Proposition 1), the optimal policy distorts inflation towards the extremes or the middle depending on whether p Ͼ or Ͻ 1/2, respectively. In the extreme cases of only small (p ϭ 0) or large (p ϭ 1) shocks, the two policies are equivalent (we are effectively in the case of full information). If large and small shocks are equally likely, p ϭ 1/2 (p(e) ϭ 1/4, all e), we are back to our discrete uniform distribution, with the pooling π P rule being outperformed by the optimal rule, π S . Interestingly, the relative loss from adopting the rule of thumb first rises and then falls with the probability of large shock, p. The reason is as follows. The two policies attain the full information outcome at the extremes, p ϭ 0, p ϭ 1: however, welfare is increasing and concave in p under π S , while it is increasing and convex under pooling, so that their ratio initially rises and then falls with p.
Many Countries
Having many countries in the currency area aggravates the distortions of asymmetric information. The standard inefficiency one-policy-fits-all increases with the number of members, and so does the incentives to misreport information: hence, larger distortions in the policy rule are required to prevent mimicking. In order to sketch the argument, let the CCA be formed by j ϭ 1,2,…N ≥ 2 identical countries, experiencing independent, discrete-uniformly distributed shocks e j . The full information rule now is
so that inflation has mean zero, and its variance σ 2 π ϭ σ 2 π րN tends to be zero as N goes to infinity. This implies, from the Central Limit Theorem, that the CCB will "always" choose an inflation rate equal to zero. It is easy to see that the incentive to exaggerate the shock rises with N. Proceeding, as in Section 3.1, 18 the optimal 
Taking the expectation and solving for the optimal report, as in Section 3.1, yields the expression in the text.
report of country i is now ẽ i ϭ Ne i . The larger the number of member countries, the larger the incentive to overemphasize the shock. As N grows sufficiently large, it must become increasingly costly to separate the types. Hence, the distortions associated with asymmetric information are likely to be fostered by the number of CCA members.
DISCUSSION
When members of a currency union experience idiosyncratic shocks, a conflict of interest over the stance of monetary policy arises. If governments have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, this leads to a problem of adverse selection. National authorities exaggerate their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. Ignoring the problem can be extremely costly, since the monetary authority ends up inappropriately implementing "stop and go" policies that are detrimental to welfare. The paper shows that monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric shocks of different sizes. In order to provide the incentives for truthful revelation, monetary policy becomes unduly expansive when all members are in serious depressions and unduly restrictive when they all experience booms; conversely, it reacts too little to economic conditions when some face mild expansions (contractions) and some are in depression (boom). Overall, asymmetric information aggravates the problem of tailoring the policy response to the state of the union's economy, and causes a welfare loss, that is increasing in the number of member countries. We also show that disregarding some of the information reported by national authorities and adopting a "rule of thumb" is never efficient, although a rule of thumb closely mimics the optimal rule when large shocks are either very rare or very frequent.
How robust are these conclusions? The model is clearly very stylized, yet we think that the conclusions are quite general: for example, the model can be given microfoundations (see the Appendix). An interesting question for future research is whether intertemporal considerations may help to reduce the distortions required for incentive compatibility. Along the lines of Atkenson and Lucas (1992) , one may conjecture that the CCB may induce truth-telling by conditioning her policy not only on current reports, but also on past ones, so that, for example, high inflation in a bad state today may come at the expense of a lower inflation in a bad state tomorrow. The resulting dynamics of inflation over time is a topic worth investigating.
APPENDIX: MICROFOUNDATIONS
Here, we provide a theoretical underpinning for the choice of our welfare function. Consider the following model. The world consists of two countries. Each country (domestic and foreign) is populated by a representative infinitely lived agent. We abstract from labor mobility. Both economies are endowed with one homogeneous good, e t , which is defined in terms of random (i.i.d.) deviations from the trend ē ϭ 0. For each period, consumers face a given sequence of prices, tax rates, and public spending, {p t , g t , τ t }, observe the realization of their endowment, and decide how much to consume, c t , and save out of their disposable income. The endowment is taxed at a proportional rate, τ t . Households save by carrying nominal money balances, M tϩ1 into next period. There is neither capital nor bonds in the economy. Preferences are described by an additively separable utility function, where separability is assumed both with respect to time and with respect to the arguments. Consumers choose the sequence {c t , M tϩ1 } ∞ 0 so as to maximize the present discounted value of their utility stream.
where 0 Ͻ β Ͻ 1 denotes the rate of time preference, M tϩ1 րp t is the stock of domestic money balances at the beginning of period t ϩ 1, expressed in units of time t goods, V and H are quasi-concave functions. Great simplification is obtained by assuming that utility is linear in consumption, u(c t ) ϭ c t (cf. Calvo and Guidotti 1993) . The consumer's budget constraint under monetary independence is
Similarly, in a CCA, the constraint reads
where M t ϭ M t ϩ M* t represents the common currency, which is held by both domestic and foreign households, 20 and σ ϭ 1 Ϫ σ* represents the share of the common currency that is held by domestic consumers. For simplicity, we assume that e t , is a zero mean i.i.d. disturbance. Depending on the exchange rate regime, the national central bank (or the CCB) chooses the sequence of nominal balances,
Government Budget Constraint
National governments raise revenue by taxing the endowment at proportional rate τ t and by seigniorage. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the choice of τ t which is assumed mandatory, fixed and constant over time. Again, the budget constraint differs between monetary regimes. Under MI we have 19. Since we need to justify why individuals hold real money balances, we need a model of intertemporal choice. An alternative approach would be to assume that money economizes on transaction costs. In this case real balances enter the budget constraint rather than the utility function. Under certain regularity conditions, the two approaches are equivalent (see Feenstra 1986) .
20. Here, we are assuming that the sequence of prices in the two countries is the same when they share the same currency.
In turn, in a CCA, the constraint reads
By substituting the government constraint into the consumer constraint for MI and CCA, respectively, one finds the resource constraint c t ϩ g t ϭ e t .
Solution
Solving the private sector maximization problem for the case of MI (Equation 20) subject to the constraint (Equation 21), and re-arranging the first-order conditions for c t and M tϩ1 , recalling linearity, yields
This is a standard arbitrage condition that assures that no gains can be made by reallocating consumption over time. Finally, we place the following restriction on the choice of the optimal monetary policy. We assume that the central bank chooses the rate of money growth in order to achieve a rate of inflation that is a time-invariant function of the disturbance(s), so that π t ϭ (p tϩ1 Ϫ p t ) րp t ϭ π (e t ). It is easy to see that this restriction implies that the rate of money growth, µ t ϭ (M tϩ1 Ϫ M t )րM t is also a time-invariant function of the disturbance(s) and equals π (.). 21 Thus, we can write the demand for money and consumption in MI as follows:
where it is convenient to define π(.) ϭ (p tϩ1 Ϫ p t )րp tϩ1 ϭ π (.)ր1 ϩ π (.). 22 The same conditions apply in a CCA, with σM replacing M, and assuming that policy rule is a time-invariant function of both disturbances, e, e*. These expressions immediately yield the indirect utility function W in MI
21. From the first-order condition for real balances, one can see that a constant rate of inflation implies constant money demand M tϩ1 րp t . But since M tϩ1 րp t ≡ (M tϩ1 րp tϩ1 )(p tϩ1 րp t ), constant inflation and money demand require that M tϩ1 րp tϩ1 is also constant. Thus, in equilibrium, the rate of money growth must equal the inflation rate.
22. With a slight abuse of terminology, from now on we will call π, rather than π , the inflation rate. Also, given the stationarity of the policy rule, although not of the inflation rate, we suppress the time notation when it is not necessary. and similarly for the CCA. The welfare function shows the nature of the optimal seigniorage problem of this economy. The inflation tax finances the provision of public goods, which are valued by consumers. Inflation, however, reduces real money holdings and induces distortions in the demand for money. It is immediate to show that this welfare function, under intuitive conditions, satisfies the assumptions in Equation (1).
Proof of Proposition 1 Setting p(e) ϭ 1/4 in Problem 1 gives the following first-order conditions:
π Ϫs,Ϫs : W π(Ϫs,Ϫs) (Ϫs, π(Ϫs,Ϫs)) ϭ λW π(Ϫs,Ϫs) (Ϫsր2, π(Ϫs,Ϫs)) , 
where we have exploited the fact that the multipliers of the two incentive compatibility constraints are equal by symmetry: λ ϩ ϭ λ Ϫ ϭ λ. Since the r.h.s. of Equation (29) is zero, π(-s, -s/2) is not distorted and coincides with π E (-s, -s/2). Also, from Equation (34), we see that π(-s/2, s/2) ϭ 0 ϭ π E (-s/2, s/2). But then the r.h.s. of Equation (31) is also zero, implying π(-s, s) ϭ 0 ϭ π E (-s, s). Thus, we are left with Equations (28) and (35). These, and the incentive constraint (Equation 14) can be written for our quadratic specification as follows: Next we show that a pooling rule that sets π(Ϫsր2,Ϫs) ϭ π(Ϫs,Ϫs) ϭ π(Ϫsր2,Ϫsր2) ϭ π P Ϫ cannot satisfy the first-order conditions above. Suppose that π P Ϫ satisfies optimality condition for state (-s/2, -s/2) (Equation 33). But then Equation (28) would imply that also W π(Ϫs,Ϫs) (Ϫs, π P Ϫ ) ϭ 0, which is not possible since it violates the assumption that W πe (π, e) Ͻ 0 all π and e.
Distribution of Shocks
Proposition 1 is modified as follows. 
ϭ λW π(Ϫs,s) (sր2, π(Ϫs,s))(1 Ϫ p) ϩ
λW π(Ϫs,s) ( Ϫ sր2, π( Ϫ s,s))(1 Ϫ p) ,
π Ϫsր2,Ϫsր2 : (
2 W π(Ϫsր2,Ϫsր2) (Ϫsր2, π(Ϫsր2,Ϫsր2))(1 ϩ λ) ϭ 0 ,
π Ϫsր2,sր2 :
[W π(Ϫsր2,sր2) (Ϫsր2, π(Ϫsր2, sր2)) ϩ W π(Ϫsր2,Ϫsր2) (sր2, π(Ϫsր2, sր2))] ( 
Comparing Equation (37) with Equation (28), we see that the condition for π(-s, -s) is unaffected by the change in the distribution. A similar condition holds for π(s, s), so that part (i) of Proposition 2 holds.
Comparing Equation (39) with Equation (29), we see that when p ϭ 1/2, π(-s, -s/2) is not distorted, while if p Ͼ 1/2, the r.h.s. of Equation (39) is positive, since W π(-s,-s/2) (-s/2, π) Ͻ 0, so that π(-s, -s/2) is below the full information value (see part (iv) of Proposition 2).
Finally, comparing Equation (45) with Equation (34), we see that π(-s/2, s/2) is the same as in full information. This and Equation (44) imply that also π(-s, s) from Equation (41) is the same as under full information (cf. point (iii) of Proposition 2).
The case for small asymmetric shocks (-s/2, s) is slightly more complex, since there are multiple solutions. Computing these solutions numerically and taking the one that delivers global maximum gives a value of π(-s/2, s) Ͻ s/2 (which is reasonable since the π(-s/2) ϭ s/2). When this inequality is satisfied, we see that the r.h.s. of Equation (46) (2p Ϫ 1ր2)π Ϫ sր4 is surely negative for p ≥ 1/2. Thus, under this condition, the l.h.s. of Equation (46) is also negative, implying that π A (-s/2, s) Ͼ π E (-s/2, s) (cf. part (ii) of Proposition 2).
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